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THE OPERATOR APPROACH TO ENTROPY GAMES
MARIANNE AKIAN, STÉPHANE GAUBERT, JULIEN GRAND-CLÉMENT, AND JÉRÉMIE GUILLAUD
Abstract. Entropy games and matrix multiplication games have been recently introduced by Asarin et al. They
model the situation in which one player (Despot) wishes to minimize the growth rate of a matrix product, whereas
the other player (Tribune) wishes to maximize it. We develop an operator approach to entropy games. This allows
us to show that entropy games can be cast as stochastic mean payoff games in which some action spaces are
simplices and payments are given by a relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence). In this way, we show that
entropy games with a fixed number of states belonging to Despot can be solved in polynomial time. This approach
also allows us to solve these games by a policy iteration algorithm, which we compare with the spectral simplex
algorithm developed by Protasov.
1. Introduction
1.1. Entropy games and matrix multiplication games. Entropy games have been introduced by Asarin et
al. [ACD+16]. They model the situation in which two players with conflicting interests, called “Despot” and
“Tribune”, wish to minimize or to maximize a topological entropy representing the freedom of a half-player,
“People”. Entropy games are special “matrix multiplication games”, in which two players alternatively
choose matrices in certain prescribed sets; the first player wishes to minimize the growth rate of the infinite
matrix product obtained in this way, whereas the second player wishes to maximize it. Whereas matrix
multiplication games are hard in general (computing joint spectral radii is a special case), entropy games
correspond to a tractable subclass of multiplication games, in which the matrix sets have the property of being
invariant by row interchange, the so called independent row uncertainty (IRU) assumption, sometimes also
called row-wise or rectangularity assumption. In particular, Asarin et al. showed in [ACD+16] that the problem
of comparing the value of an entropy game to a given rational number is in NP ∩ coNP, giving to entropy
games a status somehow comparable to other important classes of games with an unsettled complexity,
including mean payoff games, simple stochastic games, or stochastic mean payoff games, see [AM09] for
background.
Another motivation to study entropy games arises from risk sensitive control [FHH97, FHH99, AB17]: as
we shall see, essentially the same class of operators arise in the latter setting. A recent application of entropy
games to the approximation of the joint spectral radius of nonnegative matrices (without making the IRU
assumption) can be found in [GS18]. Other motivations originate from symbolic dynamics [Lot05, Chapter
1.8.4].
1.2. Contribution. We first show that entropy games, which were introduced as a new class of games, are
equivalent to a class of zero-sum mean payoff stochastic games with perfect information, in which some
action spaces are simplices, and the instantaneous payments are given by a Kullback-Leibler entropy. Hence,
entropy games fit in a classical class of games, with a “nice” payment function over infinite action spaces.
To do so, we introduce a slightly more expressive variant of the model of Asarin et al [ACD+16], in which
the initial state is prescribed (the initial state is chosen by a half-player, People, in the original model). This
may look like a relatively minor extension, so we keep the name “entropy game” for it, but this extension
is essential to develop an operator approach and derive consequences from it. We show that the main
results known for stochastic mean payoff games with finite actions space and perfect information, namely
the existence of the value and the existence of optimal positional strategies, are still valid for entropy games
(Theorems 10 and 9). This is derived from a model theory approach of Bolte, Gaubert, and Vigeral [BGV14],
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together with the observation that the dynamic programming operators of entropy games are definable in
the real exponential field. Then, a key ingredient is the proof of existence of Blackwell optimal policies, as a
consequence of o-minimality, see Theorem 8. Another consequence of the operator approach is the existence
of Collatz-Wielandt optimality certificates for entropy games, Theorem 13. When specialized to the one
player case, this leads to a convex programming characterization of the value, Corollary 14, which can also
be recovered from a characterization of Anantharam and Borkar [AB17].
Our main result, Theorem 16, shows that entropy games in which Despot has a fixed number of significant
states (states with a nontrivial choice) can be solved strategically in polynomial time, meaning that optimal
(stationary) strategies can be found in polynomial time. Thus, entropy games are somehow similar to
stochastic mean payoff games, for which an analogous fixed-parameter tractability result holds (by reducing
the one player case to a linear program). This approach also reveals a fundamental asymmetry between the
players Despot and Tribune: our approach does not lead to a polynomial bound if one fixes the number
of states of Tribune. In our proof, o-minimality arguments allow a reduction from the two-player to the
one-player case (Theorem 9). Then, the one-player case is dealt with using several ingredients: ellipsoid
method, separation bounds between algebraic numbers, and results from Perron-Frobenius theory.
The operator approach also allows one to obtain practically efficient algorithms to solve entropy games.
In this way, the classical policy iteration of Hoffman-Karp [HK66] can be adapted to entropy games. We
report experiments showing that when specialized to one player problems, policy iteration yields a speedup
by one order of magnitude by comparison with the “spectral simplex” method recently introduced by
Protasov [Pro15].
Let us finally complete the discussion of related works. The formulation of entropy games in terms of
“classical”mean payoff games inwhich the payments are given by a Kullback-Leibler entropy builds on known
principles in risk sensitive control [FHH99, AB17]. It can be thought as a version for two player problems
of the Donsker-Varadhan characterization of the Perron-eigenvalue [DV75]. The latter is closely related to
the log-convexity property of the spectral radius established by Kingman [Kin61]. A Donsker-Varadhan
type formula for risk sensitive problems, which can be applied in particular to Despot-free player entropy
games, has been recently obtained by Anantharam and Borkar, in a wider setting allowing an infinite state
space [AB17]. In a nutshell, for Despot-free problems, the Donsker-Varadhan formula appears to be the
(convex-analytic) dual of the Collatz-Wielandt formula. Chen and Han [CH14] developed a related convex
programming approach to solve the entropy maximization problem for Markov chains with uncertain
parameters. We also note that the present Collatz-Wielandt approach, building on [AGN11], yields an
alternative to the approach of [ACD+16] using the “hourglass alternative” of [Koz15] to produce concise
certificates allowing one to bound the value of entropy games. By comparison with [ACD+16], a essential
difference is the use of o-minimality arguments: these are needed because we study the more precise version
of the game, in which the initial state is fixed. Indeed, a counter example of Vigeral shows that the mean
payoff may not exist in such cases without an o-minimality assumption [Vig13], whereas the existence of the
mean payoff holds universally (without restrictions of an algebraic nature on the Shapley operator) if one
allows one player to choose the initial state, see e.g. Proposition 2.12 of [AGG12]. Finally, the identification of
tractable subclasses of matrix multiplication games can be traced back at least to the work of Blondel and
Nesterov [BN09].
2. Entropy games
An entropy game E is a perfect information game played on a finite directed weighted graph G. There are 2
players, “Despot”, “Tribune”, and a half-player with a nondeterministic behavior, “People”. The set of nodes
of the graph is written as the disjoint union D ∪ T ∪ P, where D , T and P represent sets of states in which
Despot, Tribune, and People play. We assume that the set of arcs E is included in (D × T) ∪ (T × P) ∪ (P ×D),
meaning that Despot, Tribune, and People alternate their actions. A weight mpd , which is a positive real
number, is attached to every arc (p , d) ∈ P × D. All the other arcs in E have weight 1. An initial state, d¯ ∈ D,
is known to the players. A token, initially in node d¯, is moved in the graph according to the following rule. If
the token is currently in a node d belonging to D, then, Despot chooses an arc (d , t) ∈ E and moves the token
to a node t. Similarly, if the token is currently in a node t ∈ T, Tribune chooses an arc (t , p) ∈ E and moves
the token to node p. Finally, if the token is in a node p ∈ P, People chooses an arc (p , d′) ∈ E and moves
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the token to a node d′ ∈ D. We will assume that every player has at least one possible action in each state
in which it is his or her turn to play. In other words, for all d ∈ D, the set of actions {(d , t) ∈ E} must be
nonempty, and similar conditions apply to t ∈ T and p ∈ P.
A history of the game consists of a finite path in the directed graph G, starting from the initial node d¯. The
number of turns of this history is defined to be the length of this path, each arc counting for a length of one
third. The weight of a history is defined to be the product of the weights of the arcs arising on this path. For
instance, a history (d0 , t0 , p0 , d1 , t1 , p1 , d2 , t2)where di ∈ D, ti ∈ T and pi ∈ P, makes 2 and 1/3 turn, and its
weight is mp0d1mp1d2 .
A strategy of Player Despot is a map δ which assigns to every history ending in some node d in D an arc of
the form (d , t) ∈ E. Similarly, a strategy of Player Tribune is a map τ which assigns an arc (t , p) ∈ E to every
history ending with a node t in T. The strategy δ is said to be positional if it only depends on the last node d
which has been visited and eventually of the number of turns. Similarly, the strategy τ is said to be positional
if it only depends on t and eventually of the number of turns. These strategies are in addition stationary, if
they do not depend on the number of turns.
For every integer k, we define as follows the game in horizon k with initial state d¯, Ek
d¯
. We assume that
Despot and Tribune play according to the strategies δ, τ. Then, People plays in a nondeterministic way.
Therefore, the pair of strategies δ, τ allows for different histories. The payment received by Tribune, in k
turns, is denoted by Rk
d¯
(δ, τ). It is defined as the sum of the weights of all the paths of the directed graph
G of length k with initial node d¯ determined by the strategies δ and τ: each of these paths corresponds
to different successive choices of People, leading to different histories allowed by the strategies δ, τ. The
payment received by Despot is defined to be the opposite of Rk
d¯
(δ, τ), so that the game in horizon k is
zero-sum. In that way, the payment Rk
d¯
measures the “freedom” of People, Despot wishes to minimize it
whereas Tribune wishes to maximize it.
We say that the game Ek
d¯
in horizon k with initial state d¯ has the value V k
d¯
if for all  > 0, there is a strategy
δ∗ of Despot such that for all strategies τ of Tribune,
 + V k
d¯
> Rk
d¯
(δ∗ , τ) ,(1)
and similarly, there is a strategy τ∗ of Tribune such that for all strategies δ of Despot,
Rk
d¯
(δ, τ∗) > V kd¯ −  .(2)
The strategies δ∗ and τ∗ are said to be -optimal. In other words, Despot can make sure his loss will not
exceed V k
d¯
+  by playing δ∗, and Tribune can make sure to win at least V kd¯ −  by playing τ∗. The strategies
δ∗ and τ∗ are optimal if they are 0-optimal, i.e., if we have the saddle point property:
Rk
d¯
(δ, τ∗) > Rk
d¯
(δ∗ , τ∗)  V k
d¯
> Rk
d¯
(δ∗ , τ) ,(3)
for all strategies δ, τ of Despot and Tribune. If the value V k
d¯
exists for all choices of the initial state d¯, we
define the value vector of the family of games (Ekd)d∈D in horizon k, to be V k : (V kd )d∈D ∈ RD .
We now define the infinite horizon game E∞¯
d
, in which the payment received by Tribune is given by
R∞¯
d
(δ, τ) : lim sup
k→∞
(Rk
d¯
(δ, τ))1/k
and the payment received by Despot is the opposite of the latter payment. (The choice of limsup is somehow
arbitrary, we could choose liminf instead without affecting the results which follow.) The value V∞¯
d
of the
infinite horizon game E∞¯
d
, and the optimal strategies in this game, are still defined by a saddle point condition,
as in (1), (2), (3), the payment Rk
d¯
(δ, τ) being now replaced by R∞¯
d
(δ, τ).
We denote by V∞  (V∞d )d∈D ∈ RD the value vector of the infinite horizon games (E∞d )d∈D .
We associate to the latter games the dynamic programming operator F : RD → RD , such that, for all
X ∈ RD , and d ∈ D,
Fd(X)  min(d ,t)∈E max(t ,p)∈E
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′Xd′ .(4)
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To relate this operator with the value of the above finite or infinite horizon games, we shall interpret these
games as zero-sum stochastic games with expected multiplicative criteria. The one-player case was studied
in particular by Howard and Matheson under the name of risk-sensitive Markov decision processes [HM72]
and by Rothblum under the name of multiplicative Markov decision processes, see for instance [Rot84].
For any node p ∈ P, we denote by Ep : {(p , d) ∈ E} the set of actions available to People in state p, and we
denote by qp the probability measure on Ep obtained by normalizing the restriction of the weight function m
to Ep : qpd  mpd/γ(p)with γ(p)  ∑(p ,d′)∈Ep mpd′ . Then, F can be rewritten as
Fd(X)  min(d ,t)∈E max(t ,p)∈E
©­«γ(p)
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
qpd′Xd′
ª®¬ .
A pair of strategies δ and τ of both players, determine the stochastic process (Dk , Tk , Pk)k>0 with values
in D × T × P, such that P(Dk+1  d′ | H)  qpd′ for all d′ ∈ D and all histories H having k − 1/3 turns and
ending in p ∈ P, and such that the transitions from D to T and T to D are deterministicaly determined by
the strategies δ and τ respectively as in the above description of the entropy games E. Then, the payoff
of the entropy game with horizon k starting in d¯, Ek
d¯
, is equal to the following expected multiplicative/
risk-sensitive criterion:
Rk
d¯
(δ, τ)  E (γ(P0) · · · γ(Pk−1) | D0  d¯) .
Proposition 1. The value of the entropy game in horizon k with initial state d, Ekd , does exists. The value vector V k of
this game is determined by the relations V0  e, V k  F(V k−1), k  1, 2, . . . , where e is the unit vector (1, ..., 1)> of
RD . Moreover, there exist optimal strategies for Despot and Tribune that are positional.
Proof. This result follows from a classical dynamic programming argument. Indeed, in the one player case,
that is when there is only one choice of δ or one choice of τ, that is when the operator F contains only a
“min” or a “max”, the game is in the class of Markov Decision Problems with multiplicative criterion and the
Dynamic Programming Principle has already been proved in this setting in [HM72, Rot84], see also [Whi82,
Th. 1.1, Chap 11]. This shows that the game has a value which satifies V k  F(V k−1) and V0  e, and that an
optimal strategy is obtained using these equations. For instance for a “max” (when Despot has only one
choice), Tribune chooses any action (t , p) attaining the maximum in
max
(t ,p)∈E
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′V k−1d′  max(t ,p)∈E
©­«γ(p)
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
qpd′V k−1d′
ª®¬ .
The resulting strategy τ∗ is positional and it is optimal among all strategies τ. A similar result holds for a
“min”, leading to a positional strategy δ∗ for Despot.
Let us now consider the general two-player case. Define the sequence of vectors V k by
V kd  min(d ,t)∈E
max
(t ,p)∈E
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′V k−1d′ .(5)
with V0d  1, for all d ∈ D. We construct candidate strategies δ∗ and τ∗, depending on the current position
and number of turns, as follows. In state d, if there remains k turns to be played, Despot selects an action
(d , t) achieving the minimum in (5). We denote by δ∗(d , k) the value of t such that (d , t) is selected. In state t,
if there remains k − 1/3 turns to be played, Tribune chooses any action (t , p) attaining the maximum in
max
(t ,p)∈E
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′V k−1d′ .
Now, if Player Despot plays according to δ∗, we obtain a reduced one player game. It follows from the same
dynamic programming principle as above (applied here to time dependent transition probabilities q and
factors γ(·)) that the value vector Vδ∗ ,k of this reduced game in horizon k does exist and satisfies the recursion
Vδ
∗ ,k
d  max(δ∗(d ,k),p)∈E
©­«γ(p)
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
qpd′V
δ∗ ,k−1
d′
ª®¬ ,
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with Vδ
∗ ,0
d  1, for all d ∈ D. Since Vδ
∗ ,k is the value, we have Vδ
∗ ,k
d > R
k
d(δ∗ , τ) for all strategies τ of Tribune.
Noting that Vδ
∗ ,k
d  V
k
d by definition of δ
∗, we deduce that Despot, by playing δ∗, can guarantee that his loss
in the horizon k game starting from state d will not exceed V kd . A dual argument shows that by playing τ
∗,
Tribune can guarantee that his win will be at least V kd . 
Example 1. Consider the entropy game whose graph and dynamic programming operator are given by:
F1(X)  min
(
X1 ,max(X1 ,X2 + X3)
)
,
F2(X)  max (X1 ,X2 + X3) ,
F3(X)  min ( max(X2 ,X2 + X3),X2) .
For readability, the states of Despot are shown twice on the picture. Here, D  {d1 , d2 , d3}, T  {t1 , t2 , t3 , t4},
P  {a , b , c , d}, E  {(d1 , t1), (d1 , t2), (d2 , t2), (d3 , t3), (d3 , t4), (t1 , a), (t2 , a), (t2 , b), (t3 , c), (t3 , d), (t4 , c), (a , d1),
(b , d2), (b , d3), (c , d2), (d , d2), (d , d3)}, and all the weights are equal to 1, i.e., mpdi  1 for all p ∈ P and
1 6 i 6 3 such that (p , di) ∈ E.
One can check that V k  (1, φk+1 , φk), where φ0  φ1  1 and φk+2  φk + φk+1 is the Fibonacci sequence.
As an application of Theorem 10 below, it can be checked that the value vector of this entropy game is
V∞  (1, ϕ, ϕ)where ϕ : (1 + √5)/2 is the golden mean.
3. Stochastic mean payoff games with Kullback-Leibler payments
We next show that entropy games are equivalent to a class of stochastic mean payoff games in which some
action spaces are simplices, and payments are given by a Kullback-Leibler divergence.
To the entropy game E, we associate a stochastic zero-sum game with Kullback-Leibler payments, denoted
KL and defined as follows, referred to as “Kullback-Leibler game” for brevity. This new game is played by
the same players, Despot, and Tribune, on the same weighted directed graph G (so with same sets E, P,D
and same weight function m). The nondeterministic half-player, People, will be replaced by a standard
probabilistic half-player, Nature.
For any node p ∈ P, recalling that Ep : {(p , d) ∈ E} is the set of actions available to People in state p, we
denote by ∆p the set of probability measures on Ep . Therefore, an element of ∆p can be identified to a vector
ϑ  (ϑpd)(p ,d)∈Ep with nonnegative entries and sum 1. The admissible actions of Despot and Tribune in the
states d ∈ D and t ∈ T are the same in the gameKL and in the entropy game E. However, the two games
have different rules when the state p ∈ P belongs to the set of People’s states. Then, Tribune is allowed to play
again, by selecting a probability measure ϑ ∈ ∆p ; in other words, Tribune plays twice in a row, selecting first
an arc (t , p) ∈ E, and then a measure ϑ ∈ ∆p . Then, Nature chooses the next state d according to probability
ϑpd , and Tribune receives the payment −Sp(ϑ;m), where Sp(ϑ;m) is the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler
divergence between ϑ and the measure obtained by restricting the weight function m to Ep :
(6) Sp(ϑ;m) :
∑
(p ,d)∈Ep
ϑpd log(ϑpd/mpd) .
Therefore, using the notations of Section 2, we get that
Sp(ϑ;m)  − log γ(p) +
∑
(p ,d)∈Ep
ϑpd log(ϑpd/qpd)
is minimal when the chosen probability distribution ϑ on Ep is equal to the probability distribution qp of the
transitions from state p in the stochastic game defined in Section 2. Recall that relative entropy is related to
information theory and statistics [Kul97]. An interesting special case arises when m ≡ 1, as in [ACD+16],
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thus qp is the uniform distribution on Ep . Then, Sp(ϑ;m)  Sp(ϑ) : ∑(p ,d)∈Ep ϑpd log ϑpd is nothing but the
Shannon entropy of ϑ.
A history in the gameKL now consists of a finite sequence (d0 , t0 , p0 , ϑ0 , d1, t1, p1 , . . . ), which encodes
both the states and actions which have been chosen. A strategy δ of Despot is still a function which associates
to a history ending in a state in d an arc (d , t) in E. A strategy of Tribune has now two components (τ, pi), τ is
a map which assigns to a history ending in a state in t an arc (t , p) ∈ E, as before, whereas pi assigns to the
same history and to the next state p chosen according to τ a probability measure on ∆p .
To each history corresponds a path in G, obtained by ignoring the occurrences of probability measures.
For instance, the path corresponding to the history h  (d0 , t0 , p0 , ϑ0 , d1 , t1 , p1) is (d0 , t0 , p0 , d1 , t1 , p1). Again,
the number of turns of a history is defined as the length of this path, each arc counting for 1/3. So the number
of turns of h is 1 and 2/3. Choosing strategies δ and (τ, pi) of both players and fixing the initial state d0  d¯
determines a probability measure on the space of histories h. We denote by
rk
d¯
(δ, (τ, pi)) : −E (Sp0(ϑ0;m) + · · · + Spk−1(ϑk−1;m))
the expectation of the payment received by Tribune, in k turns, with respect to this measure, where Sp is as
in (6) and m is the weight function of the graph of the game. We denote by vk
d¯
the value of the game in horizon
k, with initial state d¯, and we denote by vk  (vkd )d∈D the value vector. As in the case of entropy games, we
shall use subscripts and superscripts to indicate special versions of the game, e.g.,KLkd refers to the game in
horizon k with initial state d. Note also our convention to use lowercase letters (as in vkd ) to refer to the game
with Kullback-Leibler payments, whereas we used uppercase letters (as in V kd ) to refer to the entropy game.
It will be convenient to consider more special games in which the actions of one of the players are restricted.
We will call policy of Despot a stationary positional strategy of this player, i.e., a map which assigns to every
node d ∈ D a node δ(d)  t ∈ T such that (d , t) ∈ E. Similarly, we will call policy of Tribune a map which
assigns to every node t ∈ T a node τ(t)  p ∈ P such that (t , p) ∈ E. Observe, in this definition of policy, the
symmetry between Despot and Tribune, while the game is asymetric: the policy τ is not enough to determine
a positional strategy of Tribune, because the probability distribution at every state p ∈ P is not specified by
the policy τ. The set of policies of Despot and Tribune are denoted by PD and PT , respectively.
If one fixes a policy δ of Despot, we end up with a reduced game KLk(δ, ∗) in which only Tribune has
actions. We denote by vk(δ, ∗)  (vkd(δ, ∗))d∈D ∈ RD the value vector of this game in horizon k. Similarly, if one
fixes a policy τ of Tribune, we obtain a reduced game denoted byKLk(∗, (τ, ∗)), in which Despot plays when
the state is in D, Tribune selects an action according to the policy τ when the state is in T, and Tribune plays
when the state is in P. The value vector of this reduced game is denoted by vk(∗, (τ, ∗))  (vkd(∗, (τ, ∗)))d∈D ∈ RD .
We also denote by vk(δ, (τ, ∗))  (vkd(δ, (τ, ∗)))d∈D ∈ RD the value of the reduced game in which both policies
δ of Despot and τ of Tribune are fixed, which means that only Tribune plays when the state is in P. The
systematic character of notation used here should be self explanatory: the symbol ∗ refers to the actions
which are not fixed by the policy.
We also consider the infinite horizon or mean payoff gameKL∞, in which the payment of Tribune is now
r∞¯
d
(δ, (τ, pi)) : lim sup
k→∞
k−1rk
d¯
(δ, (τ, pi)) .
For 0 < α < 1, we also consider the discounted game αKL with a discount factor α, in which the payment of
Tribune is
αrd¯(δ, (τ, pi)) : −E
(
Sp0(ϑ0;m) + αSp1(ϑ1;m) + α2Sp2(ϑ2;m) + · · ·
)
The value of the mean payoff game is denoted by v∞¯
d
, whereas the value of the discounted game is denoted
by αvd¯ . As above, we denote byKL∞(δ, ∗) andKL∞(∗, (τ, ∗)) the games restricted by the choice of policies
δ, τ, and use an analogous notation for the corresponding value vectors. For instance, αv(∗, (τ, ∗)) refers to
the value vector of the game αKL(∗, (τ, ∗)) with a discount factor α. We define the notion of value, as well as
the notion of optimal strategies, by saddle point conditions, as in Section 2.
The following dynamic programming principle entails that the value of the stochastic game with
Kullback-Leibler payments in horizon k is the log of the value of the entropy game.
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Proposition 2. The value vector vk  (vkd)d∈D of the Kullback-Leibler game in horizon k does exist. It is determined
by the relations v0  0, vk  f (vk−1), k  1, 2, . . ., where
fd(x)  min(d ,t)∈E max(t ,p)∈E log
©­«
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′ exp(xd′)ª®¬ ,(7)
and we have vkd  logV
k
d .
In order to prove Proposition 2, we recall the following classical result in convex analysis showing that the
“log-exp”function is the Legendre-Fenchel transform of Shannon entropy.
Lemma 3. The function x 7→ log(∑16i6n exi ) is convex and it satisfies
log
( ∑
16i6n
exi
)
 max
∑
16i6n
ϑi(xi − log ϑi); ϑi > 0, 1 6 i 6 n ,
∑
16i6n
ϑ j  1 .
This result is mentioned in [RW98], Example 11.12. This convexity property is a special instance of the
general fact that the log of the Laplace transform of a positive measure is convex (which follows from the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality), whereas the explicit expression as a maximum follows from a straightforward
computation (apply Lagrange multipliers rule).
Proof of Proposition 2. For a zero-sum game with finite horizon and additive criterion, the existence of the
value is a standard fact, proved in a way similar to Proposition 1. The value vector vk satisfies the following
dynamic programming equation
vkd  min(d ,t)∈E
max
(t ,p)∈E
max
ϑ∈∆p
(
−Sp(ϑ;m) + 〈ϑ, vk−1〉
)
,(8)
where 〈ϑ, x〉  ∑(p ,d′)∈Ep ϑpd′xd′ for x ∈ RD , and v0d  0. By Lemma 3,
log ©­«
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′ exp(xd′)ª®¬  log ©­«
∑
(p ,d′)∈Ep
exp(xd′ + logmpd′)ª®¬
 max
ϑ∈∆p
∑
(p ,d′)∈Ep
ϑpd′(xd′ + logmpd′ − log ϑpd′)
 max
ϑ∈∆p
(−Sp(ϑ;m) + 〈ϑ, x〉)
and so, (8) can be rewritten as vk  f (vk−1) where f is given by (7). Observe that the operator f is the
conjugate of the operator F of the original entropy game: f  log ◦F ◦ exp. It follows that vk  f k(v0) 
log Fk(V0)  logV k , where for a vector Y ∈ (R∗+)D the notation ‘ log(Y)′ denotes the vector (log(Yi))16i6D ,
and exp : log−1. 
The map f arising in (7) is obviously order preserving and it commutes with the addition of a constant,
meaning that f (x + λe)  f (x) + λe where e is the unit vector (1, ..., 1)> of RD , and λ ∈ R. Any map with
these two properties is nonexpansive in the sup-norm, meaning that ‖ f (x) − f (y)‖∞ 6 ‖x − y‖∞, see [CT80].
Hence, the map x 7→ f (xα) has a unique fixed point. For discounted games, the existence of the value and of
optimal positional strategies is a known fact:
Proposition 4. The discounted game αKL with discount factor 0 < α < 1 has a value and it admits optimal strategies
that are positional and stationary. The value vector αv is the unique solution of αv  f (αvα).
Proof. The existence and the characterization of the value are standard results, see e.g. the discussion
in [Ney03]. It is also known that the optimal strategies are obtained by selecting actions of the player attaining
the minimum and maximum when evaluating every coordinate of f (αvα), in a way similar to the proof
of Proposition 1, V k−1 there being replaced by αv. Since αv does not depend on the number of turns, the
optimal strategies are also stationary. 
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Nonexpansive maps can be considered more generally with respect to an arbitrary norm. In this setting,
the issue of the existence of the limit of vk/k  f k(v0)/k as k →∞, and of the limit of (1 − α)(αv), as α→ 1−,
where αv is the unique fixed point of x 7→ f (xα), has received much attention. The former limit is sometimes
called escape rate vector. Nonexpansiveness implies that the set of accumulation points of the sequence vk/k is
independent of the choice of v0, but it does not suffice to establish the existence of the limit; some additional
“tameness” condition on the map f is needed. Indeed, a result of Neyman [Ney03], using a technique of
Bewley and Kohlberg [BK76], shows that the two limits limk→∞ f k(v0)/k and limα→1−(1 − α)αv do exist and
coincide if f is semi-algebraic. More generally, Bolte, Gaubert and Vigeral [BGV14] showed that the same
limits still exist and coincide if the nonexpansive mapping f is definable in an o-minimal structure. A counter
example of Vigeral shows that the latter limit may not exist, even if the action spaces are compact and the
payment and transition probability functions are continuous, so the o-minimality assumption is essential in
what follows [Vig13].
In order to apply this result, let us recall the needed definitions, referring to [vdD98, vdD99] for background.
An o-minimal structure consists, for each integer n, of a family of subsets of Rn . A subset of Rn is said to be
definable with respect to this structure if it belongs to this family. It is required that definable sets are closed
under the Boolean operations, under every projection map (elimination of one variable) from Rn to Rn−1,
and under the lift, meaning if A ⊂ Rn is definable, then A ×R ⊂ Rn+1 and R×A ⊂ Rn+1 are also definable. It
is finally required that when n  1, definable subsets are precisely finite unions of intervals. A function f
from Rn to Rk is said to be definable if its graph is definable.
An important example of o-minimal structure is the real exponential field Ralg,exp. The definable sets in
this structure are the subexponential sets [vdD99], i.e., the images under the projection maps Rn+k → Rn
of the exponential sets of Rn+k , the latter being sets of the form {x | P(x1 , . . . , xn+k , ex1 , . . . , exn+k )  0}
where P is a real polynomial. A theorem of Wilkie [Wil96] implies that Ralg,exp is o-minimal, see [vdD99].
Observe in particular that the set {x ∈ R2 | x1 6 x2} is definable in this structure, being the projection of
{x ∈ R3 | x2 − x1  x23}. Using the o-minimal character of this structure, this implies that definable maps are
stable by the operations of pointwise maximum and minimum. We deduce the following key fact.
Fact 5. The dynamic programming operator f of the Kullback-Leibler game, defined by (7), is definable in the real
exponential field. 
Theorem 6 ([BGV14]). Let f : Rn → Rn be nonexpansive in any norm, and suppose that f is definable in an
o-minimal structure. Then,
lim
k→∞
f k(0)/k
does exists, and it coincides with
lim
α→1−(1 − α)
αv .
Corollary 7. Let vk  (vkd)d∈D be the value vector in horizon k of the stochastic game with Kullback-Leibler payments,
KLk , and for 0 < α < 1, let αv denote the value vector of the discounted game αKL with discount factor 0 < α < 1.
Then limk→∞ vk/k does exist and it coincides with limα→1−(1 − α)(αv).
Proof. We already noted that the map f in (7) is nonexpansive in the sup-norm. It is definable in the real
exponential field. So Theorem 6 can be applied to it. 
Corollary 7 will allow us to establish the existence of the value of the mean payoff game, and to obtain
optimal strategies, by considering the discounted game, for which, as noted in Proposition 4, the existence of
the value and of optimal policies are already known.
Let us recall that a strategy in a discounted game is said to be Blackwell optimal if it is optimal for all
discount factors sufficiently close to one. The existence of Blackwell optimal positional strategies is a basic
feature of perfect information zero-sum stochastic games with finite action spaces (see [Put05, Chap. 10] for
the one-player case, the two-player case builds on similar ideas, e.g. [GG98, Lemma 26]). We next show that
this result has an analogue for entropy games. To get a Blackwell type optimality result, we need to restrict
to a setting with finitely many positional strategies. Recall that PD (resp. PT) denotes the set of policies of
Despot (resp. Tribune). We also recall our notation v∞(δ, ∗) for the value of the mean payoff gameKL∞(δ, ∗)
in which Despot plays according to the policy δ.
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We define the projection of a pair of strategies (δ, (τ, pi)) in the game KL to be the strategy (δ, τ) in the
game E. In the present setting, it is appropriate to say that a pair of policies (δ, τ) ∈ PD × PT is Blackwell
optimal if there is a real number 0 < α0 < 1 such that, for all α ∈ (α0 , 1), (δ, τ) is the projection of a pair of
optimal strategies (δ, (τ, pi)) in the discounted game αKL.
Theorem 8. The family of discounted Kullback-Leibler games (αKL)α∈(0,1) has positional Blackwell optimal strategies.
Proof. For all α ∈ (0, 1), the discounted game has positional optimal strategies δ∗ , (τ∗ , pi∗). This follows from
the standard dynamic programming argument mentioned in the proofs of Proposition 1 and 4, noting that
δ∗(d) is obtained by choosing any t ∈ T such that (d , t) ∈ E attains the minimum in the expression
αvd  min(d ,t)∈E
max
(t ,p)∈E
max
ϑ∈∆p
(−Sp(ϑ;m) + 〈ϑ, α(αv)〉) .
Similarly, τ∗(t) is chosen to be any p ∈ P such that (t , p) ∈ E attains the maximum in
max
(t ,p)∈E
max
ϑ∈∆p
(−Sp(ϑ;m) + 〈ϑ, α(αv)〉) ,
and pi∗(p) is chosen to be the unique action ϑ attaining the maximum in
max
ϑ∈∆p
(−Sp(ϑ;m) + 〈ϑ, α(αv)〉)
(observe that the function to be maximized is strictly concave and continuous on ∆p , and that ∆p is compact
and convex, so the maximum is achieved at a unique point).
By definition of the value and of optimal strategies, we have, for all strategies δ and (τ, pi) of Despot and
Tribune respectively,
αrd(δ∗ , (τ, pi)) 6 αvd  αrd(δ∗ , (τ∗ , pi∗)) 6 αrd(δ, (τ∗ , pi∗)) ,(9)
which is equivalent to
αvd  αrd(δ∗ , (τ∗ , pi∗))  αvd(δ∗ , ∗)  αvd(∗, (τ∗ , pi∗)) .(10)
Specializing the first inequality in (9) to τ  τ∗, and bounding above the last term, we deduce that, for all for
all strategies δ and τ of Despot and Tribune respectively, we have
(11) αv(δ∗ , (τ, ∗)) 6 αvd  αv(δ∗ , (τ∗ , ∗)) 6 αv(δ, (τ∗ , ∗)) ,
where αvd(δ, (τ, ∗)) is the value of the reduced discounted 1-player discounted game αKL(δ, (τ, ∗)) starting
at d ∈ D, in which the (not necessarily positional) strategies δ of Despot and τ of Tribune are fixed. The
inequalities (11) can be specialized in particular to policies δ ∈ PD and τ ∈ PT . Then, by Proposition 4,
αv(δ, (τ, ∗)) is the unique fixed point of the self-map x 7→ τ f δd (xα) of RD , where τ f δ is the dynamic
programming operator given by
τ f δd (x)  log
©­«
∑
(τ◦δ(d),d′)∈E
mτ◦δ(d),d′ exp(xd′)ª®¬ .(12)
It follows that the map α 7→ αv(δ, (τ, ∗)) is definable in the real exponential field Ralg,exp. (To see this, observe
that, by Fact 5, the set {(x , y) | x  τ f δd (y)} × R is definable in this structure; then, taking the intersection of
this set with the definable sets {(x , y , α) | yd  xdα}, for d ∈ D, and projecting the intersection keeping only
the x and α variables, we obtain a definable set which is precisely the graph of the map 7→ αv(δ, (τ, ∗))).
For all (δ¯, τ¯) ∈ PD × PT , let I(δ¯, τ¯) denote the set of α ∈ (0, 1) such that
(13) αv(δ¯, (τ, ∗)) 6 αv(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗)) 6 αv(δ, (τ¯, ∗))
holds for all (δ, τ) ∈ PD × PT . Since the saddle point property (11) holds for all α (δ∗ and τ∗ depend on α, of
course), we have
∪(δ¯,τ¯)I(δ¯, τ¯)  (0, 1) .(14)
Observe that the set I(δ¯, τ¯) is a subset of R definable in the real exponential field, which is o-minimal. It
follows that I(δ¯, τ¯) is a finite union of intervals. Hence, (14) provides a covering of (0, 1) by finitely many
intervals, and so, one of the sets I(δ¯, τ¯)must include an interval of the form (1 − , 1).
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To show that the policies δ¯, τ¯ obtained in this way are Blackwell optimal, it remains to show that if (δ¯, τ¯)
satisfies (13) for some α, then it is the projection of a pair of optimal strategies (δ¯, (τ¯, p¯i)) in the discounted
game αKL. For this, we shall apply the existence of optimal strategies that are positional and the resulting
equations (10) and (11) to the reduced games αKL(δ¯, ∗) and αKL(∗, (τ¯, ∗)), respectively.
The first game leads to the existence of positional stationary strategies τ1 , pi1 of Tribune such that, for all
d ∈ D,
αvd(δ¯, ∗)  αrd(δ¯, (τ1 , pi1))  αv(δ¯, (τ1 , ∗)) .
Then, using (13), we get that αv(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗)) > αv(δ¯, (τ1 , ∗))  αvd(δ¯, ∗) > αv(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗)), hence the equality
αv(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗))  αvd(δ¯, ∗).
The second one leads to the existence of positional stationary strategies δ2 , pi2 of Despot and Tribune
respectively such that, for all d ∈ D,
αvd(∗, (τ¯, ∗))  αrd(δ2 , (τ¯, pi2))  αvd(δ2 , (τ¯, ∗))  αvd(∗, (τ¯, pi2)) .
Then, using (13), we deduce that αvd(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗)) 6 αvd(δ2 , (τ¯, ∗))  αvd(∗, (τ¯, pi2)) 6 αvd(δ¯, (τ¯, pi2)) 6
αvd(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗)), hence the equality αvd(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗))  αvd(∗, (τ¯, pi2))  αvd(δ¯, (τ¯, pi2)). With the equality proved
with the first game, this leads to αvd(δ¯, ∗)  αv(δ¯, (τ¯, ∗))  αvd(δ¯, (τ¯, pi2))  αvd(∗, (τ¯, pi2)). This shows that
(δ¯, (τ¯, pi2)) is a pair of optimal strategies for the discounted game αKL. Since (δ¯, τ¯) is its projection, we get
that it is Blackwell optimal. 
Theorem 9. The value v∞ of the stochastic mean payoff game with Kullback-Leibler payments does exist, and it
coincides with limk→∞ vk/k  limα→1−(1 − α)(αv). For all (δ, τ) ∈ PD × PT , the same properties hold for the values
v∞(δ, ∗) and v∞(∗, (τ, ∗)) of the reduced games in which Despot plays according to δ when the state is in D and Tribunes
plays according to τ when the state is in T, respectively. Moreover, the Blackwell optimal strategies (δ∗ , τ∗) ∈ PD × PT
of Theorem 8 satisfy, for all d ∈ D,
v∞d  v
∞
d (δ∗ , (τ∗ , ∗))  v∞d (δ∗ , ∗)  v∞d (∗, (τ∗ , ∗)) .(15)
In particular,
v∞d  minδ∈PD
v∞d (δ, ∗)  maxτ∈PT v
∞
d (∗, (τ, ∗)) .
Proof. We already noted in Corollary 7 that
lim
k→∞
vk/k  lim
α→1−(1 − α)(
αv) .(16)
Moreover, it is shown in [BGV14, Corollary 2, (iii)], as a consequence of a theorem of Mertens and
Neyman [MN81], that this limit coincides with the value of the game. These results rely on the definable and
sup-norm nonexpansive character of the dynamic programming operator f . The dynamic programming
operator f δ, associated to the reduced game determined by the strategy δ ∈ PD can be written as
f δd (x) : max(δ(d),p)∈E log
©­«
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′ exp(xd′)ª®¬ .(17)
It is definable and sup-norm nonexpansive, hence the same conclusions apply to the gameKL(δ, ∗), i.e,
lim
k→∞
vk(δ, ∗)/k  lim
α→1−(1 − α)(
αv(δ, ∗))(18)
is the value of the game KL∞(δ, ∗). We argue in the same way for the game KL(∗, (τ, ∗)), noting that the
associated dynamic programming operator is now
τ fd(x) : min(d ,t)∈E log
©­«
∑
(τ(t),d′)∈E
mτ(t)d′ exp(xd′)ª®¬ .(19)
which is still definable and sup-norm nonexpansive. Hence,
lim
k→∞
vk(∗, (τ, ∗))/k  lim
α→1−(1 − α)(
αv(∗, (τ, ∗)))(20)
is the value of the gameKL∞(∗, (τ, ∗)).
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Let δ∗ , τ∗ denote the positional Blackwell optimal strategies constructed in Theorem 8. By definition, there
is an interval (α0 , 1) such that for all α ∈ (α0 , 1), there exists pi∗ depending on α such that
αv  αv(δ∗ , (τ∗ , pi∗))  αv(δ∗ , ∗)  αv(∗, (τ∗ , pi∗))
which by (11) leads to
αv  αv(δ∗ , ∗)  αv(∗, (τ∗ , ∗))  αv(δ∗ , (τ∗ , ∗)) .(21)
Multiplying these expressions by (1 − α), passing to the limit, and using (16), (18) and (20), we obtain (15).

Remark 1. Theorem 9 shows that Player Despot has an optimal positional strategy δ∗ in the mean payoff
Kullback-Leibler game. It also shows that in the same game, the actions of Player Tribune at states t ∈ T can
be chosen according to the optimal positional strategy τ∗. This theorem does not imply, however, that at
every state p ∈ P, the optimal action ϑ ∈ ∆p can be chosen optimally according to a positional strategy pi.
Indeed, the proof by an o-minimality argument uses in an essential way the fact that there are finite actions
spaces at every states d and t, whereas ∆p is infinite. We leave for further investigation the question of the
existence of such a positional strategy, noting that it is not needed in the application to entropy games.
Remark 2. It is shown in [BGV14, Corollary 2, (iii)], as a consequence of a theorem of Mertens and
Neyman [MN81], that a stochastic game with a definable Shapley operator has a uniform value, a property
which is stronger than the mere existence of the value. Loosely speaking, a stochastic game with initial state
d is said to have a uniform value v∞d if both players can almost guarantee v
∞
d provided that the length of the
k-stage game is large enough. In the present setting, we get the following property: for any  > 0, there is a
couple of strategies of (δ, (τ, pi)) and a time K such that, for every k > K, every starting state d and every
strategies δ′ and (τ′, pi′),
rkd(δ, τ′, pi′)/k 6 v∞d + , rkd(δ′, τ, pi)/k > v∞d −  .
4. Application to the entropy game model
4.1. Existence of optimal positional strategies in the entropy game. As an application of Theorem 9, we
obtain the existence of optimal positional strategies in the entropy game model of Section 2.
Theorem 10. The infinite horizon entropy game has a value and it has optimal positional strategies, namely the
Blackwell optimal strategies (δ∗ , τ∗) ∈ PD × PT of Theorem 8. Moreover, for all initial states d,
V∞d  limk→∞
(V kd )1/k .
Proof. By Proposition 1, V k  F(V k−1) where F is as in (4). Moreover, F  exp ◦ f ◦ log is the conjugate of the
dynamic programming operator f of the Kullback-Leibler game introduced in (7). Corollary 7 shows that
v∞  limk→∞ vk/k does exists. It follows that V∞d : limk→∞(V kd )1/k  exp(v∞d ) does exist for all d ∈ D.
Let (δ∗ , τ∗) denote the Blackwell optimal strategies given by Theorem 8. We showed in Theorem 9 that
v∞  v∞(δ∗ , ∗), and by Corollary 7, we have
v∞(δ∗ , ∗)  lim
k→∞
vk(δ∗ , ∗)/k .
Using the dynamic programming principle for finite horizon 1-player games, or equivalently, by applying
Proposition 2 to the reduced finite horizon gameKLk(δ∗ , ∗), we obtain that
vk(δ∗ , ∗)/k  ( f δ∗)k(0)/k ,
where for all δ, f δ is the dynamic programming operator defined in (17) associated to the reduced game
KL(δ, ∗). Consider now the conjugate Fδ : exp ◦ f δ ◦ log, so that
(22) Fδd (X) : max(δ(d),p)∈E
©­«
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′Xd′
ª®¬ .
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By Proposition 1, for all strategies τ of Tribune, non necessarily positional, and all initial states d ∈ D, we
have
Rkd(δ∗ , τ) 6 [(Fδ
∗)k(e)]d .
Applying all the above equalities and inequalities, we deduce that
lim sup
k→∞
(Rkd(δ∗ , τ))1/k 6 limk→∞[(F
δ∗)k(e)]1/kd  exp(v∞d )  V∞d ,
so Player Despot can guarantee his loss does not exceed V∞d by playing δ
∗.
Let us now consider the reduced infinite horizon or finite horizon entropy and Kullback-Leibler games in
which the strategy of Tribune is fixed and equal to τ∗. By the same arguments as above, we show that the
positional strategy τ∗ guarantees to Player Tribune to win at least V∞d in the entropy game. Indeed, applying
successively Theorem 9 and Proposition 2, we deduce
v∞  v∞(∗, (τ∗ , ∗))  lim
k→∞
vk(∗, (τ∗ , ∗))/k  lim
k→∞
(τ∗ f )k(0)/k ,
where, for all τ, τ f is as in (19). Then, considering the conjugate τF : exp ◦τ f ◦ log, so that, for all τ,
(23) τFd(X) : min(d ,t)∈E
©­«
∑
(τ(t),d′)∈E
mτ(t)d′Xd′
ª®¬ ,
and applying Proposition 2 and 1, we deduce that
V∞d  limk→∞
(τ∗Fd)k(e)1/k 6 lim inf
k→∞
Rkd(δ, τ∗)1/k ,
for all strategies δ of Despot, non necessarily positional, and all initial states d ∈ D. So Player Tribune can
win at least V∞d by playing τ
∗. 
4.2. Comparison with the original entropy game model. The original entropy game model of Asarin et
al. [ACD+16] is a zero-sum game defined in a way similar to Section 2, up to a technical difference: in their
model, the initial state is not prescribed. The payment of Tribune in horizon k, instead of being Rk
d¯
(δ, τ),
is the quantity R¯k(δ, τ), defined now as the sum of weights of all paths of length k starting at a node in D
and ending at a node in D. Hence, R¯k(δ, τ)  ∑d∈D Rkd(δ, τ). The payment of Tribune can be defined in their
game as follows R¯∞(δ, τ)  lim supk→∞(R¯k(δ, τ))1/k . This game is denoted by Eorig,∞, we denote by V¯∞ the
value of this game, which is shown to exist in [ACD+16].
Note that in the initial model in [ACD+16], the weights mpd′ are equal to 1. The generalization to weighted
entropy games, in which the weights mpd′ are integers is discussed in Section 6 of [ACD+16]. The case in
which the weights mpd′ take rational values can be reduced to the latter case by multiplying all the weights by
an integer factor. Therefore, we will ignore the restriction that mpd′  1 in our definition of Eorig,∞ and will
refer to the entropy game model with rational weights as the entropy game model. The following observation
follows readily from Theorem 10.
Proposition 11. The value of the original entropy game Eorig,∞ considered by Asarin et al. [ACD+16] (with a free
initial state), coincides with the maximum of the values of the games E∞d , taken over all initial states d ∈ D:
V¯∞  max
d∈D
V∞d .
Example 2. Proposition 11 is illustrated by the game of Example 1. In the original model of [ACD+16], the
value, defined independently of the initial state, is (1 + √5)/2, whereas our model associates to the initial
state d1 a value 1 which differs from the values of d2 and d3.
In [ACD+16], entropy games were compared with matrix multiplication games. We present here this
correspondence in the case of general weights mpd′ . Given policies δ ∈ PD and τ ∈ PT , let A(δ) ∈ RD×T
and B(τ) ∈ RT×D be such that A(δ)dt  1 if t  δ(d) and 0 otherwise, and B(τ)td  mτ(t)d if (τ(t), d) ∈ E
and 0 otherwise, for all (d , t) ∈ D × T. We shall think of A(δ) and B(τ) as rectangular matrices. Then
R¯k(δ, τ)  ‖(A(δ)B(τ))k ‖1, where for any A ∈ RD×D , Ak denotes its kth power and ‖A‖1  ∑dd′ |Add′ | its `1
norm. From this, one deduces that R¯∞(δ, τ)  ρ(A(δ)B(τ)), where ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius of the
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matrix A. Moreover, letA and B denote the sets of all matrices of the form A(δ) and B(τ) respectively, and
letAB be the set of all matrices AB with A ∈ A and B ∈ B. The setsA, B andAB are subsets of matrices
M satisfying the property that all elements ofM have same dimension and ifMi is the set of ith rows of the
elements ofM, thenM is the set of matrices the ith row of which belongs toMi . Such a property defines
the notion of IRU matrix sets (for independent row uncertainty sets) in [ACD+16]. The following property
proved in [ACD+16] is the analogue of Theorem 9, V∞d being replaced by V¯
∞:
(24) V¯∞  min
A∈A
max
B∈B
ρ(AB)  max
B∈B
min
A∈A
ρ(AB) .
A more general property is proved in [AGN11, Section 8], as a consequence of the Collatz-Wielandt theorem
(see Corollary 13 below).
Remark 3. Our approach shows that entropy games reduce to Kullback-Leibler games, which are stochastic
mean payoff games (with compact action spaces), Asarin et al. [ACD+16] remarked that the special deterministic
entropy games, in which People has only one possible action in each state, can be re-encoded as deterministic
mean payoff games. This can also be recovered from our approach: in this deterministic case, the simplices
∆p are singletons in the Kullback-Leibler game, and the entropy function vanishes, so the Kullback-Leibler
game degenerates to a deterministic mean payoff game.
5. Applying the Collatz-Wielandt theorem to entropy games
The classical Collatz-Wielandt formulæ provide variational characterizations of the spectral radius ρ(M)
of a nonnegative matrix M ∈ RD×D :
ρ(M)  inf{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ intRD+ , MX 6 λX}
 max{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ RD+ \ {0}, MX  λX} ,
 max{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ RD+ \ {0}, MX > λX} ,
where RD+ denotes the nonnegative orthant of RD , and intRD+ its interior, i.e, the set of positive vectors. The
infimum is not always attained in the first line, whereas by writing “max”, we mean that the suprema are
always attained.
This has been extended to non-linear, order preserving and continuous self-maps of the standard positive
cone by Nussbaum [Nus86], see also [GG04, GV12, AGG12, AGN11, LLNW18]. Recall that a self-map of
RD+ is said to be order preserving if u 6 v ⇒ F(u) 6 F(v) for all u , v ∈ RD+ , the relation 6 being understood
entrywise. This map is positively homogeneous of degree 1 if F(αu)  αu, for all α > 0 and u ∈ RD+ .
Theorem 12. Let F be a continuous, order preserving, and positively homogeneous of degree 1 self-map of RD+ . Then
the following quantities coincide
lim
k→∞
max
d∈D
[Fk(e)]1/kd(25)
inf{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ intRD+ , F(X) 6 λX}(26)
max{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ RD+ \ {0}, F(X)  λX} ,(27)
max{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ RD+ \ {0}, F(X) > λX} ,(28)
Proof. The existence of (25) and the fact it coincides with (26) is proved in [GG04, Prop 1]. The fact that (26)
and (27) coincide is proved in [Nus86, Theorem 3.1]. The fact that (27) and (28) coincide is proved in [AGG12,
Lemma 2.8]. 
The common value of the expressions in Theorem 12 is called the non-linear spectral radius of F.
We showed in Proposition 11 that the value of the original entropy game Eorig is precisely
V¯∞  max
d∈D
V∞d  limk→∞
max
d∈D
[Fk(e)]1/kd
where F is the dynamic programming operator defined in (4). This operator is continuous, order preserving,
and homogeneous of degree one. Hence, we get as an immediate corollary of Theorem 12:
13
Corollary 13. The value V¯∞ of the original entropy game Eorig (with a free initial state) coincides with any of the
following expressions
inf{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ intRD+ , F(X) 6 λX}(29)
max{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ RD+ \ {0}, F(X)  λX}(30)
max{λ > 0 | ∃X ∈ RD+ \ {0}, F(X) > λX} ,(31)
where F is the dynamic programming operator (4).
The Collatz-Wielandt formulæ of Corollary 13 are helpful to establish strong duality results, like (24). Note
that (24) is weaker than Corollary 13 since it does not imply the existence of a nonlinear vector whereas (30)
of Corollary 13 does. See also [AGG12] for an application to mean payoff games and tropical geometry. Our
main interest here lies in the following application of (29). We say that a state d of Despot is significant if the
set of actions of Despot in this state, {(d , t) ∈ E}, has at least two elements (i.e., Despot has to make a choice
in this state). We say that an entropy game is Despot-free if the Despot player does not have any significant
state. A Despot-free game is essentially a one (and half) player problem, since the minimum term in the
corresponding dynamic programming operator (4) vanishes. Indeed, for each d ∈ D, there is a unique node
t such that (d , t) ∈ E, and we define the map σ : D → T by σ(d)  t. The following corollary, which follows
from Corollary 13 by making the change of variables µ  log λ and x  logX, is also a special case of a result
of Anantharam and Borkar [AB17].
Corollary 14. The logarithm of the value of a Despot-free original entropy game is given by the value of the optimization
problem
inf µ
(µ, x) ∈ R × RD , satisfying
µ + xd > log(
∑
d′∈D
mp ,d′exd′ ) for all d ∈ D , p ∈ P such that (σ(d), p) ∈ E .(32)
Observe that the latter expression is the value of an optimization problem in which the variables are µ
and x  (xd)d∈D , the objective function is the linear form (µ, x) 7→ µ, and the feasible set is convex. Hence,
this will lead us to a polynomial time decision procedure in the Despot free case, which we develop in the
next section.
6. Polynomial time solvability of entropy games with a few significant Despot positions
By solving strategically an entropy game, we mean finding a pair of optimal policies. We assume from now
that the weights mp ,d are integers. Since policies are combinatorial objects, solving strategically the game is a
well posed problem in the Turing (bit) model of computation. Once optimal policies are known, the value of
the game, which is an algebraic number, can be obtained as the Perron root of an associated integer matrix.
Our first main result is the following.
Theorem 15. Despot-free entropy games can be solved strategically in polynomial time.
This will be proved in Section 7, by combining several ingredients: a reduction to the irreducible case, an
application of the ellipsoid method, and separation bounds for algebraic numbers.
We will also show the following generalization of Theorem 15.
Theorem 16. Entropy games in which Despot has a fixed number of significant states can be solved strategically in
polynomial time.
7. Proof of Theorem 15 and Theorem 16
We start by considering a Despot-free game. We decompose the proof of Theorem 15 in several steps,
corresponding to different subsections.
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7.1. Reduction to the irreducible case. First, we associate to a Despot-free entropy game a projected directed
graph G¯, with node set D and an arc d → d′ if there is a path (d , t , p , d′) in the original directed graph G.
We say that the game is irreducible if G¯ is strongly connected. Recall that we assumed that any node has a
successor, so that strongly connected components are all non trivial (not reduced to a node with no edge).
Lemma 17. The value of an irreducible Despot-free entropy game is independent of the initial state. Moreover, there is
a vector U ∈ intRD+ and a scalar λ∗ > 0 such that F(U)  λ∗U, and λ∗ coincides with the value of any initial state in
this game.
Proof. The non-linear Perron-Frobenius theorem in [GG04] provides a sufficient condition for the existence of
a positive eigenvector of an order preserving positively homogeneous self-map F of the interior of the cone.
It suffices to check that a certain directed graph G(F) associated to F is strongly connected. Specialized to the
present setting, this directed graph is defined as follows: the node set is D, and there is an arc from d → d′ if
lim
s→∞ Fd(sed′)  +∞ ,
where ed′  (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)> is the d′th vector of the canonical basis of RD . By considering the explicit
form of F, we see that G(F) is precisely the directed graph G¯. Hence, by Theorem 2 of [GG04], there exists a
vector U ∈ intRD+ and a scalar λ∗ > 0 such that F(U)  λ∗U. It follows from Corollary 13 and from the fact
that the value of the original entropy game is maxd∈D V∞d that V
∞
d 6 λ
∗ holds for all d ∈ D.
We next show that the other inequality holds. Recall that V∞d  limk→∞[Fk(e)]1/kd is the value of the
entropy game with initial state d, where e  (1, ..., 1)> ∈ RD+ .
Since D is finite, there is a positive scalar β > 0 such that e > βU (indeed, take β : (maxd∈D Ud)−1). Using
the order preserving and positively homogeneous character of the dynamic programming operator F, we get
Fk(e) > Fk(βU)  βFk(U)  β(λ∗)kU
and so, using that U is positive,
V∞d  limk→∞
[Fk(e)]1/kd > limk→∞(β(λ
∗)kUd)1/k  λ∗ .
Hence, V∞d  λ
∗ holds for all d ∈ D. 
Thanks to this lemma, we will speak of “value”, without mentioning the initial state, when the entropy
game is irreducible.
Every strongly connected component C of G¯ with set of nodes DC ⊂ D yields a reduced game, in which
the set of states of Despot isDC , and Tribune only selects actions such that the next state of Despot will remain
in DC for at least one action chosen by People. Moreover, People chooses only actions so that the next state
remains in DC . By definition of G¯, this reduced game is irreducible. We denote it by E[C]. The following
elementary observation allows us to reduce the general Despot-free case to the irreducible Despot-free case.
Lemma 18. In a Despot-free entropy game, the value of a state d is the maximum of the value of the irreducible games
E[C] corresponding to the different strongly connected components C of G¯ to which d has access.
Proof. This follows from a more precise of Zĳm, Theorem 5.1 in [Zĳ87], which determines the asymptotic
expansion of Fk(e) as k →∞. However, the present lemma is more elementary. Alternatively, one can note
that the operator f : log ◦F ◦ exp is precisely in the class of operators considered in [GG98, Section 4]. The
lemma is a special case of Theorem 29 there. 
Therefore, from now on, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 19. The game is Despot-free and irreducible.
We also make the following assumption.
Assumption 20. The weights mp ,d are integers.
The case in which the weights are rational numbers reduces to this one (multiplying all weights by a
common denominator does not change optimal positional strategies).
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7.2. Reduction to a well conditioned convex programming problem. Our strategy, to prove Theorem 15
when the game is irreducible is to apply the ellipsoid method to the convex programming formulation (32).
To do so, we must replace this formulation by another convex program whose feasible set is included in a
ball B2(a , R), (the Euclidean ball with center a and radius R), and contains a Euclidean ball B2(a , r), where
log(R/r) is polynomially bounded in the size of the input. The following key lemma allows us to do so. It
bounds the non-linear eigenvalue and eigenvector of the dynamic programming operator F, which have
been shown to exist in Lemma 17. We setW : max(p ,d)∈E mp ,d and n : |D |.
Lemma 21. Suppose the game is Despot-free and irreducible. Then, the value λ of the game is such that 1 6 λ 6 nW .
Moreover, there exists a vector U ∈ intRn+ such that F(U)  λU, and
1 6 Ud 6 λn−1 , ∀d ∈ D .(33)
Proof. (1) The fact that λ 6 nW follows from the first Collatz-Wielandt formula (29), which implies that
λ 6 maxd Fd(e), where e is the unit vector of RD . We have maxd Fd(e) 6 nW . Similarly, the last Collatz-
Wielandt formula (31) implies that λ > mind Fd(e). Since we assumed that every node in G has at at least
one successor, we have Fd(e) > 1 for all d ∈ D, and so λ > 1.
(2) Let (d , d′) be an arc in G¯, corresponding to a path of length 1 in G, of the form (d , t , p , d′). Then,
mpd′Ud′ 6 Fd(U)  λUd holds, with λ 6 nW and mpd′ integer. In particular, Ud′ 6 λUd holds. Since the
game is irreducible, any two vertices of G¯ are connected by a path of length at most n − 1. It follows that
Ud′/Ud 6 λn−1 holds for all d , d′ ∈ D. We may assume that the minimal entry of U is equal to 1, by dividing
U by this minimal entry. Then, Ud 6 λn−1 holds for all d. 
We denote byK the set of pairs (u , µ) ∈ RD × R ' Rn+1, such that
f (u) 6 µe + u(34a)
0 6 ud 6 (n − 1)dlog(nW)e , ∀d ∈ D ,(34b)
0 6 µ 6 dlog(nW)e + 2 ,(34c)
where dte denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to t, and f is given by (7), recalling that
e denotes the unit vector of RD . Recall that W > 1 since this is an integer, and that if n , 1, then
(n − 1)dlog(nW)e > 1. By combining Corollary 14, Lemma 17 and Lemma 21, we arrive at the following
result.
Proposition 22. The value of a Despot-free irreducible entropy game coincides with the exponential of the value of the
convex program:
min µ, (u , µ) ∈ K ,(35)
whereK is defined by (34).
Proof. If (u , µ) ∈ K , then it satisfies (32), so by Corollary 14, it is not smaller than the logarithm of the value
of the game. Hence, the value of (35) is an upper bound for the logarithm of the value of the game. Now, if
we take λ to be equal to the value of the game, we know by Lemma 21 and Lemma 17 that 1 6 λ 6 nW and
that we can find a vector U ∈ intRn+ such that F(U)  λU, and the bounds (33) on U hold. Then, setting
u : log(U) and µ : log λ, we get that (u , µ) ∈ K . It follows that the exponential of the value of (35)
coincides with the value of the game.
Finally, the convexity ofK follows from the convexity of every coordinate map of f , which is an immediate
consequence of Lemma 3. 
We denote by B2(a , r) the Euclidean ball with center a and radius r. The sup-norm ball with the same
radius and center is denoted by B∞(a , r). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 23. Let a  ((1/2)e , dlog(nW)e + 3/2) ∈ RD × R, and let
r : 1/3, R : √n + 1((n − 1) log(nW) + n + 1) .(36)
Then,
B2(a , r) ⊂ K ⊂ B2(a , R) .
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Proof. Any point (u , µ) in B∞(a , r) satisfies (1/2 − r)e 6 u 6 (1/2 + r)e and dlog(nW)e + 3/2 − r 6 µ 6
dlog(nW)e + 3/2 + r. Since n , 1, we get that (n − 1)dlog(nW)e > 1, and since r 6 1/2, we obtain that (u , µ)
satisfies the box constraints (34b) and (34c) definingK . Since f is order preserving and commutes with the
addition of a constant,
f (u) 6 f ((1/2 + r)e)  (1/2 + r)e + f (0)
6 (1/2 + r + dlog(nW)e)e 6 (1/2 + r + dlog(nW)e)e + (u + (r − 1/2)e)
 (2r + dlog(nW)e)e + u 6 (3r − 1 + µ)e + u
and so f (u) 6 µe + u as soon as r 6 1/3. We deduce that B2(a , 1/3) ⊂ B∞(a , 1/3) ⊂ K .
Moreover, since K is included in a box of width `  (n − 1)dlog(nW)e + 2, for any choice of a′ ∈ K ,
K is included in the sup-norm ball B∞(a′, `), and so, in the euclidean ball B2(a′, `
√
n + 1). It follows that
K ⊂ B2(a , R). 
7.3. Construction of a polynomial timeweak separation oracle. We shall solve Problem (35) by the ellipsoid
method [GLS81]. The latter needs the following notions.
Definition 1. LetK denote a convex body in Rq . A weak separation oracle forK is a procedure, taking as
input a rational number ν > 0 and a rational vector y ∈ Rq , which concludes one of the following: (i) asserting
that y is at Euclidean distance at most ν fromK ; (ii) finding an approximate separating half-space of precision ν,
i.e., a linear form φ : x 7→ c · x, with c ∈ Rq , of Euclidean norm at least 1, such that for every x ∈ K ,
φ(x) 6 φ(y) + ν .
Let us now recall the main complexity result about the ellipsoid method [GLS81]. To do so, we denote
by 〈r〉 the number of bits needed to code an object r, under the standard binary encoding. For instance,
if r is an integer, 〈r〉 : dlog2(r)e + 1, if r  p/q is a rational, 〈r〉 : 〈p〉 + 〈q〉, if r  (ri) is a rational vector,〈r〉 : ∑i 〈ri〉, and if ψ is a linear form with rational coefficients over Rq , ψ(x)  ∑i rixi , for x ∈ Rq , then
〈ψ〉  ∑i 〈ri〉. Here and after, the notion of length of an input refers to the binary encoding.
The ellipsoid method can be applied to solve the following problem consisting in finding an approximate
minimum of precision  of a linear form ψ with rational coefficients over a convex body K ⊂ Rq . This
means looking for a vector x∗ such that d2(x∗ ,K ) 6  and ψ(x∗) 6 minx∈K ψ(x) + , where d2 denotes
the Euclidean distance. We assume that we know a vector a ∈ K with rational coordinates, and rational
numbers 0 < r < R such that
B(a , r) ⊂ K ⊂ B(a , R) .
In that case, the size of the input of the approximate minimization problem is measured by 〈ψ〉 + 〈a〉 + 〈r〉 +
〈R〉 + 〈〉.
It is shown in [GLS81] that if the convex set K admits a polynomial time weak separation oracle, the
ellipsoid method computes an -approximate solution of the minimization problem in a time polynomial in
the size of the input. Specialized to the present setting, and taking into account the polynomial estimates for
log r and logR in Lemma 23, we get the following result.
Theorem 24 (Corollary of [GLS81, Th. 3.1]). Suppose that the set K defined by (34) admits a weak separation
oracle which runs in polynomial time in the bitsize of the input and in the bitsize of the game. Then, the ellipsoid
method returns an approximate optimal solution of precision  of Problem (35), i.e., a vector (u , µ) such that that
d2((u , µ),K ) 6  and µ does not exceed the value of Problem (35) by more than , in a time that is polynomial in
〈〉 + |E | + logW .
Recall that | · | denotes the cardinality of a set, in particular |E | denotes the number of arcs of G.
The following result allows us to apply Theorem 24 to Problem (35).
Proposition 25. The convex setK defined by (34) admits a weak separation oracle which runs in polynomial time.
To show this proposition, we need a series of arguments. Some of these arguments, like the next lemma,
are standard, whereas other arguments require some transparent but rather technical bookkeeping, exploiting
the non-expansive character of f to control the approximation errors.
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Lemma 26. Let  > 0 and t be rational numbers, and assume first that t 6 0. Then, a rational approximation of
absolute precision  of exp(t) can be computed in a time that is polynomial in 〈t〉 and 〈〉. Assume now that t > 0.
Then, a rational approximation of absolute precision  of log(t) can be computed in a time that is polynomial in 〈t〉 and
〈〉.
Proof. It is shown in [BB88] that the conclusion is true when the input belongs to a fixed compact subset of
the intervals (−∞, 0], in the case of exp, or of (0,∞), in the case of log. The fact that the same property still
holds for the whole intervals (−∞, 0] and (0,∞) follows from the range reduction techniques [Mül05]. 
Lemma 27. Let x be a vector in RD with rational entries, and let  > 0 be a rational number. An approximation of
f (x) with a sup-norm error not exceeding  can be obtained in polynomial time in 〈x〉 + 〈〉 + |E | + logW .
Proof. We have
fd(x)  max(σ(d),p)∈E log(
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′ exp(xd′)) .
Hence, it suffices to check that for every p ∈ P, the value
h(x) : log(
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′ exp(xd′))
can be approximated with a precision  within a polynomial time. We set x¯ : maxd′∈D xd′ , and make the
change of variables xd′  x¯ + x˜d′ , so that
h(x)  x¯ + log t , t :
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′ exp(x˜d′)
We observe that 1 6 t and that log has Lipschitz constant 1 over [1,∞). Hence, to evaluate h(x) with a
precision , it suffices to compute an approximation t˜ of t with precision /2, which can be done in polynomial
time thanks to Lemma 26, and then to approximate log t˜ with precision /2, which can also be done in
polynomial time by the same lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 25. Let ν > 0. Our aim is to check whether a given pair (v¯ , µ¯) is at distance at most ν from
K . Since we already showed that we can get an approximation of f in polynomial time, the proof will be a
matter of routine bookkeeping (except perhaps the use of the subdifferential of f to construct a separating
halfspace).
We denote by  > 0 a rational number,  6 1, which we shall fix in the course of the proof.
We provide the announced separation oracle. We first check that every box constraint, as well as the
non-linear constraints fd(v¯) 6 v¯d + µ¯, for d ∈ D, are satisfied up to a precision , which can be done in
polynomial time in 〈v¯〉 + 〈〉 + |E | + logW thanks to Lemma 27.
(i) If these constraints are satisfied up to a precision , we have − 6 v¯d 6 (n − 1)dlog(nW)e + ,
− 6 µ¯ 6 dlog(nW)e + 2 + , and f (v¯) 6 (µ¯ + )e + v¯. Setting v˜d  min(max(v¯d , 0), d(n − 1) log(nW)e), we
get that ‖ v¯ − v˜‖∞ 6  with v˜ satisfying the constraint (34b). Using the fact that f is nonexpansive in the
sup-norm, we deduce that f (v˜) 6 µ˜e + v˜, where µ˜  µ¯ + 3. Moreover, 0 6 µ˜ 6 dlog(nW)e + 2 + 4. Now,
since f is also convex, for all t ∈ [0, 1], we have
f (t v˜) 6 t f (v˜) + (1 − t) f (0) 6 µ˜′e + t v˜ ,
with µ˜′  tµ˜ + (1 − t)dlog(nW)e. Hence, taking t  1/(1 + 2), we get that µ˜′ satisfies the constraint (34c),
whereas v˜′  t v˜ still satisfies the constraint (34b), so that (v˜′, µ˜′) belongs toK . Using t 6 2, we also have
‖(v¯ , µ¯) − (v˜′, µ˜′)‖∞ 6 L, with L  (5 + 2(n − 1)dlog(nW)e), implying that d2((v¯ , µ¯),K ) 6 L
√
n + 1. Hence,
we shall require that
 6 1 :
ν
(5 + 2(n − 1)dlog(nW)e)√n + 1
,
to make sure that d2((v¯ , µ¯),K ) 6 ν.
(ii) Assume now that one of the box constraints is violated by more than . Then, one of the linear forms
(v , µ) 7→ ±vd or (v , µ) 7→ ±µ provides a separating half-space, and the norm of this linear form is 1. Assume
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finally that all the box constraints are satisfied up to , and that one of the non-linear constraints is violated
by more than . Let us write this constraint as
g(v , µ) : log(
∑
d′∈D
mpd′ exp(vd′)) − vd − µ 6 0
for some d ∈ D and (σ(d), p) ∈ E, so that g(v¯ , µ¯) > . Since g is convex, the differential φ of g at point (v¯ , µ¯)
satisfies
φ(v − v¯ , µ − µ¯) 6 g(v , µ) − g(v¯ , µ¯) 6 −
for all (v , µ) ∈ K , i.e.,
φ(v , µ) 6 φ(v¯ , µ¯) − , ∀(v , µ) ∈ K
showing that φ is a separating half-space. However, we need an approximate half-space given by a linear
form with rational coefficients, which we next construct by approximating φ.
To do so, we first compute the differential of g at point (v¯ , µ¯). This is the linear form
φ : (x , y) ∈ RD × R 7→
∑
d′
xd′mpd′ exp(v¯d′)/(
∑
d′′
mpd′′ exp(v¯d′′)) − xd − y .
The maximum of v¯ can be subtracted to every coordinate of v¯ without changing this linear form. Then, by
Lemma 26, the coefficients of this linear form can be approximated in polynomial time. It follows that we can
compute an approximation φ˜ of φ of precision  in polynomial time in 〈v¯〉 + 〈〉. Observe that the coefficient
of the variable y in the linear form φ is always equal to −1. Hence, the approximate linear form φ˜ can be
chosen with the same coefficient, and then, φ˜ is of norm at least 1.
Since any element (v , µ) ofK satisfies the box constraints (34b) and (34c), whereas (v¯ , µ¯) satisfies these
constraints up to  6 1, we get that
|(v , µ) − (v¯ , µ¯)|∞ 6 M : (n − 1)dlog(nW)e) + 3 ,
hence
|φ˜(v − v¯ , µ − µ¯) − φ(v − v¯ , µ − µ¯)| 6 M(D + 1), ∀(v , µ) ∈ K .
So it suffices that
 6 2 :
ν
M(D + 1)
to make sure that φ˜ defines an approximate separating half-space of precision ν.
To summarize, it suffices to take   min(1 , 2) in the previous analysis, so that the conditions of
Definition 1 are satisfied. Moreover, for this choice, all the computations take a polynomial time in
〈ν〉 + 〈v¯〉 + 〈µ¯〉, and the size |E | + logW of the description of the game. 
7.4. Using separation bounds between algebraic numbers to compare policies. It follows fromTheorem 24
that we can compute in polynomial time an approximate solution of Problem (35) with precision . We next
show that it is possible to choose  with a polynomial number of bits, in such a way that this approximate
solution allows us to identify an optimal policy. We shall actually prove a version of this result in the more
general two-player case. This extended version, stated as Corollary 29, will apply both to the Despot-free
case, and to the case of entropy games with a fixed number of significant states, see Section 7.6. To prove it,
we rely on separation bounds for algebraic numbers.
Theorem 28 ([Rum79]). Let p be a univariate polynomial of degree n with integer coefficients, possibly with multiple
roots. Let S be the sum of the absolute values of its coefficients. Then, the distance between any two distinct roots of p is
at least
(2n n2 +2(S + 1)n)−1 .
To any given pair (δ, τ) of policies, one can associate a directed sub-graph G(δ, τ) of G, obtained, by
erasing for all d ∈ D, every arc in {(d , t) ∈ E} except {d , δ(d)}, and similarly, by erasing for all t ∈ T, every arc
in {(t , p) ∈ E} except {t , τ(t)}. The dynamic programming operator of the game associated to this sub-graph
G(δ, τ) coincides with the conjugate τFδ : exp ◦τ f δ ◦ log of (12) and is equal to the linear operator with
matrix τMδ ∈ ND×D :
(37) τFδ : RD → RD , X 7→ τMδX ,
19
where the entry (d , d′) of τMδ is equal to mτ◦δ(d),d′ when (τ ◦ δ(d), d′) ∈ E and to zero otherwise. Then, the
value of the entropy game starting in state d, R∞d (δ, τ) coincides with the maximum of the Perron-roots (that
is the positive eigenvalues which coincide with the spectral radii) of the submatrices of τMδ with nodes in a
strongly connected component to which d has access in the graph G(δ, τ). The value of the original entropy
game coincides with the Perron-root of τMδ.
Corollary 29. There exists a rational function (n ,W) 7→ ηsep(n ,W) > 0 such that for every two different pairs (δ, τ)
and (δ′, τ′) which yield different values of the entropy game, these two values differ by at least ηsep(n ,W) and
ηsep(n ,W) > exp(−poly(n + logW))
where the polynomial inside the exponential is independent of the input.
Proof. Given a pair (δ, τ) of policies, the values of the entropy game are eigenvalues of the matrix A  τMδ ∈
ND×D . Observe that the entries of A are integers bounded byW . Let fA be the characteristic polynomial of A.
The coefficient of the monomial of degree n − k in fA is the sum of the Ckn principal minors of A of size k. By
Hadamard’s inequality, each absolute value of these minors is at most (√nW)k , and so, every coefficient of fA
has an absolute value bounded by Ckn(
√
nW)k and their sum is 6 (2√nW)n . Two different pairs of strategies
yield two characteristic polynomials, fA and fB , whose product is of degree 2n and whose sum of absolute
value of coefficients is bounded by the product of such bounds for fA and fB , so by (2√nW)2n . Therefore, the
size S appearing in Theorem 28 is bounded by (2√nW)2n . We deduce that if the two pairs of strategies yield
distinct values, the distance between these values is at least
ηsep(n ,W) : (2(2n)n+2((2d
√
neW)2n + 1)2n)−1 .
This number is rational and satisfies
ηsep(n ,W) > exp(−poly(n + logW)),
for some polynomial function poly. Since the above lower bound is true for every two pairs of different
policies (δ, τ) and (δ′, τ′), we obtain the result. 
Hence, if two policies of Tribune yield different values λ and λ′, then, |λ − λ′ | is bounded below by the
rational number ηsep > 0 whose number of bits is polynomially bounded in the size of the input.
7.5. Synthesis of an optimal strategy of Tribune from an approximate solution of the convex program in
Proposition 22. To any policy τ of Tribune, we associate a dynamic programming operator τF, which is the
specialization of the map τFδ of previous section to the case where δ  σ. This is the self-map of RD defined
by
τFd(X) 
∑
(τ(σ(d)),d′)∈E
mτ(σ(d))d′Xd′ .
So τF(X)  τMX, where τM  τMσ is the |D | × |D | matrix with nonnegative entries equal to mτ(σ(d))d′ when
(τ(σ(d)), d′) ∈ E and zero otherwise.
7.5.1. The simpler situation in which every policy τ of Tribune yields an irreducible matrix. To explain our method,
we make first the restrictive assumption that for every policy τ of Tribune, the matrix τM is irreducible. In
particular, we can take an optimal policy τ∗. By a standard result of Perron-Frobenius theory [BP94], τ∗M has
a left eigenvector pi with positive entries, associated to the spectral radius λτ∗ : ρ(τ∗M), called Perron root.
Hence, piτ∗M  λτ∗pi. Since τ∗ is optimal, λτ∗  λ∗, where λ∗ is the value of the entropy game starting from
any node d ∈ D, see Lemma 17. Moreover, by applying Lemma 21 to the linear map U 7→ (τ∗M)TU, where T
denotes the transposition, we deduce that pid/pid′ 6 (nW)n−1.
For any rational number  > 0, the ellipsoid algorithm, applied to the optimization problem of Proposi-
tion 22, yields in polynomial time a vector u and a scalar µ such that µ 6 log λ∗ +  and d2((u , µ),K ) 6 .
So there exists (u˜ , µ˜) ∈ K such that ‖u − u˜‖∞ 6  and |µ − µ˜| 6 . Since (u˜ , µ˜) ∈ K , and log λ∗ is the value
of (35), we deduce that log λ∗ 6 µ˜ 6 µ + , so λ∗ exp(−) 6 exp(µ) 6 λ∗ exp(). Using (34), and assuming
that  6 1, we deduce that ud −ud′ 6 (n−1)dlog(nW)e+2 6 (n−1)(log(nW)+1)+2, for all d , d′ ∈ D. Using
the nonexpansivity of f , we also obtain that f (u) 6 f (u˜)+e 6 u˜+(µ˜+)e 6 (µ+3)e+u 6 (log λ∗+4)e+u.
Taking U : (Ud)d∈D with Ud : exp(ud), we get F(U) 6 λ∗ exp(4)U and Ud/Ud′ 6 (enW)n−1e2.
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We choose any policy τ such that F(U)  τMU. Therefore,
τ(σ(d)) ∈ argmax
τ∈PT
∑
(τ(σ(d)),d′)∈E
mτ(σ(d))d′Ud′ .
We claim that τ is optimal if  is sufficiently small.
To show the latter claim, we observe that τ∗MU 6 F(U). For all d ∈ D,
0 6 pid(λ∗ exp(4)Ud − Fd(U)) 6 pid(λ∗ exp(4)Ud − (τ∗MU)d)
6
∑
d′∈D
pid′(λ∗ exp(4)Ud′ − (τ∗MU)d′)
 pi(λ∗ exp(4)U − τ∗MU)
 λ∗(exp(4) − 1)piU .(38)
Using pid/pid′ 6 (nW)n−1 and Ud/Ud′ 6 (enW)n−1e2, we deduce that piU 6 pidUd(1 + (n − 1)(enW)2(n−1)e),
so F(U) > λU, where λ : λ∗[1 − (exp(4) − 1)(n − 1)e(enW)2(n−1)]. In view of the formula of λ, we can
choose  > 0, with a polynomially bounded number of bits, such that λ > λ∗ − ηsep. Since, τMU > λU,
we have ρ(τM) > λ and so ρ(τM) > λ∗ − ηsep. Since λ∗ is the maximum of the values of all the policies,
ρ(τM) 6 λ∗. By definition of the separation parameter ηsep given inCorollary 29, this implies that ρ(τM)  λ∗,
and so the policy τ of Tribune which we just constructed is optimal, showing the claim.
In the preceding argument, the computation (38) may look a bit magic at the first sight, it should become
intuitive if one interprets it as an approximate complementary slackness condition for the semi-infinite
program of Proposition 22, the invariant measure pi playing the role of a Lagrange multiplier.
When some policies τ yield a reduciblematrix τM, the synthesis of the optimal policy τ still exploits the
same idea with an additional technicality, since we can only guarantee that the inequality Fd(U) > λUd is
valid for every state d such that pid > 0. We explain the more technical argument in the next section.
7.5.2. Synthesis of an optimal strategy of Tribune, in general. Recall that if M is a reducible nonnegative matrix,
a class of M is a strongly connected component of the directed graph of M, and that this class is basic if the
B × B submatrix of M, denoted by MBB , has Perron root ρ(M). It is known [BP94] that M has always a basic
class, and a nonnegative left eigenvector associated with ρ(M). Moreover, choosing a basic class B which
is final among the basic classes of M, that is such that the set S of nodes d′ ∈ D that are reachable in the
directed graph of M starting from some node in the basic class B does not contain any node of another basic
class, then there exists a nonnegative left eigenvector pi so that its support {d | pid , 0} coincides with S. We
shall assume that pi, S and B satisfy these properties, for M  τ∗M corresponding to an optimal policy τ∗. We
set N : D \ B, and for any D ×D matrix M, any vector u ∈ RD , and any subsets F and G of D, we denote by
MFG the F × G submatrix of M and by vF the vector of RF given by vF : (vd)d∈F . Since B is a basic class and
B has access to any element of S, we get that no element of S \ B has access to an element of B, and since pi
equals zero outside S, we get that the restriction of piτ∗M to B equals piBτ
∗
MBB and so piBτ
∗
MBB  λ∗piB . The
same computation as in Section 7.5.1 restricted to the elements d ∈ B now gives
0 6 pid(λ∗ exp(4)Ud − Fd(U)) 6 pid(λ∗ exp(4)Ud − (τ∗MU)d)
6 piB(λ∗ exp(4)UB − (τ∗MBBUB + τ∗MBNUN ))
 λ∗(exp(4) − 1)piBUB − piBτ∗MBNUN .
The bounds on U obtained in Section 7.5.1 are still valid, and the ones of pid/pid′ are valid only for
d , d′ ∈ B using piBτ∗MBB  λ∗piB and the irreducibility of τ∗MBB . We deduce that Fd(U) > λUd for all
d ∈ B, for the same λ as in Section 7.5.1. Moreover, piBτ∗MBNUN 6 λ∗(exp(4) − 1)piBUB . We define
′ : λ∗(exp(4) − 1)en(enW)2(n−1), so that τ∗MdNUN 6 ′Ud for all d ∈ B, where τ∗MdN is the dth line of the
matrix τ∗MBN .
We first choose, any policy τ and set B′ such that τMdDU > λUd and τMdN′UN′ 6 ′Ud , for all d ∈ B′,
with N′  D \ B′. We know from the above analysis that there is always at least one policy τ and set B′ with
this property (namely τ∗ and B′  B). Moreover, such a policy and set can be obtained by the following
algorithm. Indeed, let us start from any policy τ such that F(U)  τMU, and choose B′ as the set of d ∈ D
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such that τMdDU > λUd . Then, B ⊂ B′ since τMdDU  Fd(U). At each step of the algorithm, one applies the
following operations to each d ∈ B′ in some order: set N′  D \ B′ and check if τMdN′UN′ 6 ′. If this does
not hold, change τ(σ(d)) to any action so that τMdDU > λUd and τMdNUN 6 ′. If this is impossible, then
eliminate d from B′ and continue. Then stop at any step in which B′ does not change. Since the cardinality of
B′ decreases by one at each step to which one does not stop and B′ ⊃ B, we get that the algorithm stops after
at most n iterations and needs at most n2 products of a matrix by a vector, so it takes a polynomial time.
Moreover at each step and so at the end of the algorithm, we have B′ ⊃ B and N′ ⊂ N .
We deduce that τMB′B′UB′ > (λ − ′)UB′ , showing that ρ(τM) > ρ(τMB′B′) > (λ − ′). In view of the
formula of λ and ′ we can always choose  > 0, with a polynomially bounded number of bits, such that
λ − ′ > λ∗ − ηsep. Hence, ρ(τM)  ρ(τMB′B′)  λ∗, since ρ(τM) is an eigenvalue of τM. We also deduce from
τMB′B′UB′ > (λ − ′)UB′ that every state d ∈ B′ has value λ∗. Finally, since the game is irreducible, we can
always replace τ(σ(d)) for d < B′ to make B′ accessible from any initial state, so that the policy τ is optimal.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 15.
7.6. Derivation of Theorem 16 from Theorem 15. By Theorem 9,
V∞d  minδ∈PD
V∞d (δ, ∗)
Observe that |PD | 6 |E |s , where s is the number of significant states for despot, hence, if s is fixed, this
minimum involves a polynomial number of terms. Thanks to the separation bound given in Corollary 29,
it suffices to compute an approximation of each V∞d (δ, ∗) for some  > 0 such that log  is polynomially
bounded in the size of the input, to make sure that a policy δ achieving the minimum in the above expression,
in which every term V∞d (δ, ∗) is replaced by its approximate value, is an optimal policy.
8. Multiplicative policy iteration algorithm and comparison with the spectral simplex method of Protasov
We now consider the question of solving entropy games in practice.
8.1. Algorithms. The equivalence between entropy games and some special class of stochastic mean payoff
games, through logarithmic glasses (see Section 3), will allow us to adapt classical algorithms for one or two
player zero sum games, such as the value iteration and the policy iteration algorithm. We next present a
multiplicative version of the policy iteration algorithm, which follows by adapting policy iteration ideas
for two player games by Hoffman and Karp [HK66], with “multiplicative” policy iteration techniques of
Howard and Matheson [HM72], Rothblum [Rot84] and Sladky [Sla76], The latter “multiplicative” policy
iteration techniques apply to the Despot-free case. For clarity, we shall explain first policy iteration in the
special Despot-free case: this is more transparent, and this also will allow us to interpret Protasov’s spectral
simplex method [Pro15] as a variant of policy iteration. The newer part here is the two player case, which is
dealt with in Section 9.
We assume that D  T  {1, . . . , |T |} and σ is the identity in (32) . Let τF and τM, τ ∈ PT , be defined as in
the previous section. If τM is irreducible, in particular if all its entries are positive, τM has an eigenvector
Xτ > 0, associated to the Perron root λτ : ρ(τM). Moreover, Xτ is unique up to a multiplicative constant and
is called a Perron eigenvector. If all the matrices τM, τ ∈ PT are irreducible, one can construct a multiplicative
version of the policy iteration, Algorithm 1.
The following result shows that Algorithm 1 does terminate. The proof relies on a multiplicative version
of the classical strict monotonicity argument in policy iteration, which was already used by Howard and
Matheson [HM72], Rothblum [Rot84] and Sladky [Sla76]. We reproduce the short proof for completeness.
Proposition 30. Consider Algorithm 1, where the computations are performed in exact arithmetics and all the
matrices τM, τ ∈ PT are supposed to be irreducible. Then, the sequence λτk is increasing as long as τk , τk−1.
Moreover, the algorithm ends after a finite number of iterations k, and λτk is the value of the game (at any initial state).
Proof. The property that λτk is increasing uses the general property that for an irreducible nonnegative
matrix M, and for a positive vector u, Mu > λu (component-wise) and Mu , λu implies ρ(M) > λ. Then,
the algorithm terminates since the number of policies τ is a finite set, and so {λτ | τ ∈ PT} is finite. When
τk  τk−1, we get F(Xτk )  λτkXτk , and Lemma 17 shows that λτk is the value of the game (at any initial
state). 
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Algorithm 1 Multiplicative policy Iteration for Despot-free entropy games
1: Initialize k  1, τ0, τ1 , τ0 randomly.
2: while τk , τk−1 do
3: Compute the Perron root λτk and a Perron eigenvector Xτk of τkM.
4: Compute a new policy τk+1 such that, for all t ∈ T,
τk+1(t) ∈ argmax
p∈P, (t ,p)∈E
∑
t′∈T, (p ,t′)∈E
mp ,t′Xτ
k
t′ ,
and set τk+1(t)  τk(t) if this choice is compatible with the former condition.
5: k ← k + 1
6: end while
7: return the optimal policy τk , the Perron root λτk and Perron eigenvector Xτk of τkM.
Algorithm 1 has a dual version, in which maximization is replaced by minimization, in order to solve the
Tribune-free setting of entropy games. For this dual version of Algorithm 1, the sequence λτk is decreasing
as long as τk , τk−1. This uses the property (dual to the previous one) that for an irreducible nonnegative
matrix M, and for a positive vector u, Mu 6 λu and Mu , λu implies ρ(M) < λ. Then the algorithm
terminates as for the primal version.
In practice, Algorithm 1 can only be implemented in an approximate way. A bottleneck in this algorithm
is the computation of the Perron root and Perron eigenvector. The later can be computed by standard double
precision algorithms, like the QR method. The latter method requires O(D3) flops, where D is the size of
the matrix τM associated to a policy τ. (Note that such complexity estimates in an informal “floating point”
arithmetic model are meaningful only for well conditioned instances, in contrast with the Turing-model
complexity estimates that we derived unconditionnally in Section 7.) One may also use a more scalable
algorithm, like the power algorithm. In fact, we shall see in Algorithm 5 that the power idea can be applied
directly and in a simpler way to solve the non-linear equation, avoiding the recourse to policy iteration. So it
is not clear that the power algorithm will be the best choice to compute the eigenpair in situations in which
Algorithm 1 is competitive. In the experiments which follow, we used the QR method in Algorithm 1.
In [Pro15], Protasov introduced the Spectral Simplex Algorithm. His algorithm is a variant of Algorithm 1
in which at every iteration the policy is improved only at one state, which is the first state t such that
Ft(Xτk ) > λτkXτkt . We shall also consider another version of Algorithm 1, in which we also change the policy
at only one state t, but we choose it in order to maximize the expression Ft(Xτk ) − λτkXτkt . We shall refer to
this algorithm as "Spectral Simplex-D" since this is analogous to Dantzig’s pivot rule in the original simplex
method [Ye11].
The Spectral Simplex Algorithm introduced by Protasov in [Pro15] is described in the Despot-free setting
in Algorithm 2.
The Spectral Simplex Algorithm with Dantzig update is shown in Algorithm 3, again in the Despot-free
setting.
One can also adapt the Algorithms 2 and 3 to the Tribune-free setting, again using minimization instead
of maximization and replacing τF by Fδ.
8.2. Numerical experiments. We next report numerical experiments in the case of Despot-free in order
to compare Protasov’s spectral simplex algorithm (with and without the improvement of Dantzig’ pivot
rule) with the multiplicative policy iteration algorithm (Algorithm 1). In the log-log figures 1 and 2, these
algorithms are respectively named "Policy Iteration", "Spectral Simplex" and "Spectral Simplex-D".
We constructed random Despot-free instances in which D  T has cardinal n, and every coordinate of the
operator is of the form Ft(X)  max16p6m ∑t′ Aptt′Xt′ , where (Aptt′) is a 3-dimensional tensor whose entries
are independent random variables drawnwith the uniform law on {1, . . . , 15}. Remember thatm is an integer
which represents the number of possible different actions per state t. All the results shown on the figures are
the average made over 30 simulations, they concern the situation in which one of the two parameters m , n is
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Algorithm 2 Spectral Simplex Algorithm [Pro15]
1: Initialize k  1, τ0, τ1 , τ0 randomly.
2: while τk , τk−1 do
3: Compute the Perron root λτk and a Perron eigenvector Xτk of τkM.
4: Set τk+1(t)  τk(t) for t ∈ T  {1, . . . , |T |}.
5: bool = true, t  1.
6: while (bool) and (t 6 |T |) do
7: if τkFt(Xτk ) , maxp∈P, (t ,p)∈E ∑t′∈T, (p ,t′)∈E mp ,t′Xτkt′ then
8: Choose
τk+1(t) ∈ argmax
p∈P, (t ,p)∈E
∑
t′∈T, (p ,t′)∈E
mp ,t′Xτ
k
t′ .
9: bool = false.
10: end if
11: t ← t + 1.
12: end while
13: k ← k + 1
14: end while
15: return the first policy τk such that τk−1  τk , the Perron root λτk and a Perron eigenvector Xτk of the
matrix τkM.
Algorithm 3 Spectral Simplex Algorithm for Despot free game - Dantzig update
1: Initialize k  1, τ0, τ1 , τ0 randomly.
2: while τk , τk−1 do
3: Compute the Perron root λτk and a Perron eigenvector Xτk of τkM.
4: Set τk+1(t)  τk(t) for t  1, . . . , |T |.
5: Compute the vector
(t)16t6|T |  (Ft(Xτk ) − λτkXτkt )16t6|T | .
6: Choose t∗ ∈ argmax16t6|T | t .
7: Choose
τk+1(t∗) ∈ arg max
p∈P, (t∗ ,p)∈E
∑
t′∈T, (p ,t′)∈E
mp ,t′Xτ
k
t′ .
8: k ← k + 1
9: end while
10: return the first policy τk such that τk−1  τk , the Perron root λτk and a Perron eigenvector Xτk of the
matrix τkM.
kept constant while the other one increases. The time is given in seconds. The computations were performed
on Matlab R2016a, using an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6500 CPU @ 2.59GHz processor with 12,0Go of RAM.
In both figures, Spectral Simplex-D appears to be more efficient than the Spectral Simplex algorithm with
its original rule. However both algorithms are experimentally outperformed by policy iteration, by one to
two order of magnitude, when n →∞, whereas when m →∞ (for constant parameter n), the performance
of the three algorithms seem to deteriorate at the same rate.
9. Two-player entropy games: multiplicative policy iteration and power algorithm
Let us now consider the general two-player case. For δ ∈ PD and τ ∈ PT , let Fδ (resp. τFδ) be the dynamic
programming operator of the game in which the strategy of Despot, δ, is fixed (resp. the strategies of Despot
and of Tribune, δ and τ are fixed), see (22) (resp. (37)). We assume here that the matrices τMδ of the linear
operators τFδ, δ ∈ PD , τ ∈ PT , see (37), are irreducible.
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Figure 1. Performance of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 for different n  10, ..., 500.
Figure 2. Performance of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 for different m  10, ..., 500.
Then, the Hoffman-Karp’s idea [HK66] is readily adapted to the multiplicative setting: in the following
algorithm, a sequence δk is constructed in a similar way as τk in the dual version of Algorithm 1, except that
in Step 3, λδk and Xδk are computed by applying Algorithm 1 to the dynamic programming operator Fδk in
which the strategy of Despot is fixed to δk . We call this the multiplicativeHoffman-Karp algorithm. taIt can
also be viewed as an “exact” version of the policy iteration algorithm of Hoffman and Karp [HK66] for f .
A similar proof as the one of Proposition 30 shows that Algorithm 4, implemented in exact arithmetics,
terminates and is correct under the previous assumption that for any pair of policies of the two players, the
associated transition matrix is irreducible. Indeed, as for the dual version of Algorithm 1, λδk is decreasing
as long as δk , δk−1. Then, since again the set of policies of Despot is finite, the algorithm ends.
To have an additional point of comparison, we used a power type algorithm, more precisely, the projective
version of the Krasnoselski-Mann iteration, proposed in [GS18]. The original Krasnoselski-Mann iteration
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Algorithm 4 Policy Iteration for two-player entropy games
1: Initialize k  1, δ0, δ1 , δ0 randomly.
2: while δk , δk−1 do
3: Apply Algorithm 1 to Fδk . This returns a policy τk ∈ PT , the Perron root λδk and the Perron
eigenvector Xδk of τkMδk .
4: Compute a new policy δk+1 such that, for all d ∈ D,
δk+1(d) ∈ argmin
t∈T, (d ,t)∈E
max
(t ,p)∈E
©­«
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′Xδ
k
d′
ª®¬ ,
taking δk+1(d)  δk(d) if it belongs to the latter argmin.
5: k ← k + 1
6: end while
7: return the first policies (δk , τk) such that δk  δk−1, and the Perron root λδk and the Perron eigenvector
Xδ
k of Mδk ,τk .
was developed in [Man53, Kra55], its analysis was extended and refined by Ishikawa [Ish76] and Baillon and
Bruck [BB92]. Recall that
Fd(X)  min(d ,t)∈E max(t ,p)∈E
∑
(p ,d′)∈E
mpd′Xd′ ,
and let us define
Hd(X)  (XdGd(X))1/2 , where Gd(X)  Fd(X)(∏d′∈E Fd′(X))1/|D | .
Every fixed point of H is an eigenvector X ∈ RD+ of F such that
∏
d′∈E Xd  1, indeed
H(X)  X ⇐⇒ (XdGd(X))1/2  Xd , ∀d ∈ D
⇐⇒ Gd(X)  Xd , ∀d ∈ D
⇐⇒ Fd(X)(∏d′ Fd′(X))1/|D |  Xd , ∀d ∈ D
⇐⇒ Fd(X)  λXd , ∀d ∈ D , and
∏
d′∈E
Xd  1 ,
for some λ > 0 (since then λ  (∏d′ Fd′(X))1/|D |). It can be shown as a corollary of a general result of
Ishikawa [Ish76] concerning nonexpansive mappings in Banach spaces that Algorithm 5 does converge if F
has an eigenvector in the interior of the cone. We refer the reader to [GS18] for more details on the analysis of
the projective Krasnoselski-Mann iteration. We use Hilbert’s projective metric dH(X,Y)  ‖ log(X)− log(Y)‖H
(with ‖X‖H  maxd Xd −mind Xd) to test the approximate termination.
Algorithm 5 Power algorithm for two-player entropy games
1: Initialize k  0, V0  e ∈ RD ,V1  F(X0).
2: while dH(V k+1 ,V k) >  do
3: V k ← V k+1
4: V k+1 ← H(V k)
5: k ← k + 1
6: end while
7: return the first vector V k such that dH(V k+1 ,V k) 6 .
The log-log figures 3 and 4 show the performances of the power algorithm and the two-player policy
iteration algorithm. The computation were performed on the same computer as in the previous section; the
time is still given in seconds. The policy iteration algorithm outperforms the power algorithm asymptotically
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for large number of actions m, whereas for large number of states n, the power algorithm is more efficient.
The experimentally observed efficiency of the –naive– power algorithm actually reveals that the random
instances we considered are relatively “easy”.
Figure 3. Performance of Algorithms 4 and 5 for n  10, ..., 2000.
Figure 4. Performance of Algorithms 4 and 5 for m  10, ..., 200.
10. Concluding remarks
We developed an operator approach for entropy games, relating them with risk sensitive control via
non-linear Perron-Frobenius theory. This leads to a theoretical result (polynomial time solvability of the
Despot-free case), and this allows one to adapt policy iteration to these games. Several issues concerning
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policy iteration in the spectral setting remains unsolved. A first issue is to understand what kind of
approximate eigenvalue algorithms are best suited. A second issue is to identify significant classes of entropy
games on which the Hoffman-Karp type policy iteration algorithm can be shown to run in polynomial time
(compare with [Ye11, HMZ11] in the case of Markov decision processes). In view of the asymmetry between
Despot and Tribune, one may expect that Tribune-free entropy games are at least as hard as deterministic
mean payoff games, it would be interesting to confirm that this is the case.
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